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Abstract 
Research on the phenomenon of selective exposure to information demonstrates that after 
preliminary or final decisions, people show a preference for supporting rather than conflicting 
information (confirmation bias). In this article, we examine conditions that increase or decrease 
distortions in the search for information. We report on four experiments indicating that the 
confirmation bias is influenced by whether people focus on their decision or on the presented pieces of 
information during the information search. Focusing on the decision, for example, because a reward for 
a correct decision is promised or simply because participants repeatedly think of it, increases the 
confirmation bias. On the other hand, if participants focus on the available pieces of information 
because they have to invest money in order to search for information or because they have to evaluate 
the individual pieces of information, the confirmation bias decreases. Implications for theoretical 
understanding and interventions for decision-making situations are discussed.  
 
Key words: selective exposure to information after decisions – dissonance theory – salience – 
decision vs. information focus – incentives – costs – commitment 
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The Path or the Goal? - Decision vs. Information Focus in Information Seeking Bias after 
Decisions 
Studies investigating information seeking behavior after decisions have shown that once committed 
to an option, people prefer supportive as opposed to conflicting information (for overviews see 
Frey, 1986; Frey, Schulz-Hardt, & Stahlberg, 1996). One theory that can explain this phenomenon 
is dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957, 1964): After having made a decision, cognitive dissonance 
arises from the knowledge about the disadvantages of the chosen and the advantages of the non-
chosen alternative. Dissonance can be reduced by searching for information supporting the decision 
(consonant information) and avoiding such information conflicting with it (dissonant information). 
This tendency has been shown not only to occur after final but also after preliminary still reversible 
decisions (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001). It also arises if the experimental situation is 
adapted more closely to reality (Jonas et al., 2001; Fischer, Jonas, Frey, & Schulz-Hardt, 2005), if 
people are deciding in groups (Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Lüthgens, & Moscovici, 2000) or if real 
decision-makers, such as managers, are observed in experiments (Schulz-Hardt et al., 2000, see also 
the related research by Carlson & Russo, 2001, for pre-decisional distortions in the context of legal 
trials). All in all, the results suggest that biased searching for supportive information is a widespread 
phenomenon.  
The quality and success of decisions depend on the amount and kind of information that is 
considered during the decision process (cf. e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Kirschenbaum, 1992; Darley, 
Fleming, Hilton, & Swann, 1988; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980; Kray & Galinsky, 2003). 
Yet, if the search for and processing of information is clearly biased in favor of a decision-maker’s 
initial preferences, potential risks may be overlooked (cf. e.g., Darley et al., 1988; Kray & Galinsky, 
2003). When new information becomes available after an initial decision, open-mindedness in 
dealing with new information is important to rectify a wrong decision as early as possible.  
One factor influencing the tendency to selective exposure to information is the focus 
participants have during the information search (Jonas et al., 2001). Whereas focusing on the 
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decision increases the preference for supporting information, focusing on the available pieces of 
information reduces it. Jonas et al. (2001) suggested that in sequential information search people 
focus on the decision because having only one piece of information at a time makes it necessary to 
relate it to the decision preference. In simultaneous information search, however, people have 
access to all available pieces of information at once, allowing them to compare, evaluate and 
integrate the different pieces, thereby inducing an information focus. Moreover, Jonas et al. 
provided evidence that focusing on the decision increased participants’ commitment, which 
partially mediated the effects. Studies by Pomerantz, Chaiken, and Tordesillas (1995) suggest that a 
participant’s commitment to a decision is reflective of the decision’s salience in the mind of that 
person. 
In the present research we want to further investigate the focus-hypothesis and provide 
converging evidence regarding the role of focus in showing that there is a wide range of different 
situational factors, like incentives, costs, and attention, that shift focus towards either the decision or 
the information and thereby affect the information search.  
The current research 
We report four experiments testing these predictions. All followed a similar procedure: 
Students worked on a decision-making case, first made a preliminary decision and were then 
offered additional pieces of information by receiving a list of statements each summarizing the topic 
of one available article. Half of the additional information was clearly consonant, and half dissonant 
with the previous decision.1 After participants had selected those articles they would like to read 
they indicated their final decision. In all experiments the central dependent variable was the 
difference between the number of chosen supporting and conflicting pieces of information, which 
we call the confirmation bias. Our hypothesis for all experiments is that circumstances encouraging 
                                                
1
 Consonant pieces of information were those supporting the previous decision (information in favor of the chosen or 
against the rejected alternative) and dissonant pieces those conflicting with it (information against the chosen or in favor 
of the rejected alternative). All pieces of information were either based on former research or pre-tested to ensure that 
participants understood the direction of information (supporting vs. conflicting) and that all information was of 
comparable strength. 
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participants to focus on their decision will increase confirmation bias, whereas circumstances 
leading participants to focus on the information search will decrease it.  
EXPERIMENT 1 
In the first experiment, we hypothesized that introducing a monetary incentive to make a 
correct decision increases confirmation bias because the incentive leads people to repeatedly think 
of their decision preference and thus increases decision salience.  
According to a cost-benefit perspective of decision-making (e.g., Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 
1993) the selection of decision strategies is the result of a trade-off between a desire to make a 
correct decision and a desire to minimize effort. In situations in which incentives are involved, 
people want to make a decision with the best possible outcome. Indeed, research shows that 
incentives increase the amount of attention given to a task (Stone & Ziebart, 1995), lead people to 
invest more time and think in more complex terms (e.g., Ford & Weldon, 1981; McAllister, 
Mitchell, & Beach, 1979, Exp. 3). In addition, accuracy motivation has been found to balance the 
information search (Lundgren & Prislin, 1998; Johnston, 1996). However, if incentives for a correct 
decision cause people to increase the attention given to a task (Stone & Ziebart, 1995), it might also 
induce people to focus more on their decision, to increase their desire to make a correct decision 
and thus increase the decision’s salience. Increased selective exposure might be the consequence.  
Method 
Participants and design. Twenty seven students (18 female) from the University of Munich 
participated in this experiment based on a 2 x 2 (reward for correct decision: given vs. not given, 
type of information: supporting vs. conflicting) factorial design with repeated measures on the 
second factor. 
Procedure. The decision-making case in this study was about a company’s investment 
problem and the participants were asked imagine themselves in the role of a manager (see e.g., 
Frey, 1981, Exp. 1). The company wanted to transfer parts of its production capacities to either 
country A or to country B, which were both described in terms of 16 business traits, like tax levels 
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etc.. In the information search 10 statements by economic experts were presented. These had 
allegedly been asked to give a recommendation on which of the two countries seemed to be better 
suited for investment (e.g., “The labor market in country B offers qualified managerial staff as well 
as qualified skilled workers. Therefore, an investment in country B is recommended.”). In the 
reward condition, it was emphasized that the additional information could help them find out what 
the correct decision alternative was and that they would receive a reward of DM 5 (about US $ 
2.50) if they chose the correct option. In the no-reward condition there was no such information. 
When the experiment was over, participants were debriefed, thanked, and received DM 5.  
Results and Discussion 
The 2 x 2 ANOVA of the experimental design revealed a marginal main effect for type of 
information, F(1, 25) = 3.51, p < .08 (overall, participants selected more supporting, M = 1.59, SD 
= 1.31, than conflicting statements, M = 1.11, SD = 1.09), and the predicted interaction between 
“type” and “reward”, F(1, 25) = 4.78, p < .04 (see Table 1)2, indicating that promising a reward for 
the correct decision increased the preference for supporting compared to conflicting information. 
This effect, first shown in the selective exposure paradigm, at first glance seems counter-intuitive 
considering the cost-benefit approach. Yet, it is in accordance with the above outlined focus-
hypothesis, which proposes that incentives leading participants to pay more attention to their 
decision preference and that consequently making the decision problem more salient will increase 
the confirmation bias.  
Experiment 2 
However, incentives might also make participants focus more on additional information to search 
for: Participants who have to pay money for the information search may think more carefully about 
what information to choose. We suggest that this induces an information focus leading to a decrease 
in confirmation bias. We tested this prediction in Experiment 2.  
                                                
2
 In all studies a few participants revised the preliminary decision at the end. If they were excluded from the analyses 
the effects remained basically the same. We also checked whether the kind of decision (alternative A or B) interacted 
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Method 
Participants and design. There were thirty-one participants (19 female) from the University 
of Munich who were told that they could win a ticket for a cinema visit in this experiment based on 
a 2 x 2 (cost for information search: yes vs. no, type of information: supporting vs. conflicting) 
factorial design with repeated measures on the second factor.  
Procedure. Participants had to make a decision whether they wanted to receive a free ticket 
for the movie “Mathilda” or “Michael”, which were both scheduled to open at cinema theatres in 
town in the coming weeks. For the information search we had summarized articles from movie 
reviews and presented a list of 12 statements (e.g., “movie Michael – excellent entertainment”) 
from which participants could make their selection of articles they wanted to read. The information 
search was either free or cost 0.50 DM (about 25 cents) per piece of information. In the end, 
participants were debriefed and got a cinema voucher. 
Results and Discussion 
The 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed a main effect for costs, F(1, 29) = 7.90, p < .01: Imposing 
monetary costs on the information search reduced participants’ willingness to search for additional 
information overall (costs: M = 2.19, SD = 1.28 vs. no costs M = 3.87, SD = 2.00) – this finding is 
in accordance with the cost-benefit approach to decision-making (Gilliland, Schmitt, & Wood, 
1993; Payne et al., 1993). However, the predicted interaction between “type of information” and 
“costs”, F(1, 29) = 4.14, p = .05 (see Table 2), showed that interestingly the reduction of the search 
for supporting information was greater than the reduction of the search for conflicting information. 
Thus the introduction of information search costs reduced the confirmation bias.3 
Taken together the results from Studies 1 and 2 illustrate that monetary incentives can have 
                                                                                                                                                              
with the experimental manipulations but found no reliable interactions. Gender was in no study associated with the 
information search. 
3
 Even though in this experiment participants literally paid a fee to consider information, we suggest the key point is not 
the cost but rather the more careful consideration of information that the manipulation apparently induced. In 
accordance with this notion are the finding of an additional experiment (n = 75) showing that participants who were 
asked to write down reasons why they selected a specific piece information also revealed a decreased confirmation bias 
(M = –0.62, SD = 1.51, i.e. these participants even showed a preference for conflicting information, vs. M = 0.08, SD = 
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very different effects on the information search depending on whether they apply to the decision or 
to the information search. This pattern is supported by an additional experiment (n = 81), which we 
only want to report very briefly. Here we manipulated both benefits of a correct decision (promising 
participants a monetary reward if they made the correct decision) and costs for the information 
search (in form of cognitive effort by telling participants to memorize those information titles they 
wanted to read in more detail and later write them down on an information request sheet) using the 
same decision case as in Study 1: Both effects found in the previous experiments were replicated. 
An incentive for the correct decision increased bias in information search (M = +0.21, SD = 1.12 
without vs. M = +0.74, SD = 1.36 with reward)4, whereas increasing the cost of information search 
reduced the bias (M = +0.76, SD = 1.59 without vs. M = +0.23, SD = 0.77 with costs). 
EXPERIMENT 3 
In this experiment we used more direct focus manipulations: For decision focus we asked 
participants to think of their decision preference while searching for information. For information 
focus we instructed participants to concentrate on all available pieces of information by comparing 
and evaluating them. In addition, we used commitment as an indirect measure to assess the 
decision’s salience in the different experimental conditions (see Pomerantz et al., 1995). We 
expected that repeatedly thinking about the prior decision would increase the commitment to the 
decision. On the other hand, concentrating on the available pieces of information should decrease 
the decision’s salience and thus reduce commitment.  
Method 
Participants and design. Seventy-seven students (48 female) from the University of Munich 
participated in this experiment based on a 3 x 2 (focus: no focus, decision focus, information focus, 
type of information: supporting vs. conflicting) factorial design with repeated measures on the 
second factor. 
                                                                                                                                                              
1.42 for the group who did not have to give reasons), F(1, 73) = 4.22, p < .05. 
4
 In the reward condition participants also searched for more information altogether (M = 3.40, SD = 1.56) than without 
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Procedure. The decision problem in this study was whether or not alternative healing 
methods should be covered by health insurance (see Jonas et al., 2001). Participants were informed 
that currently a preliminary law passed by the German parliament settled this question but that a 
definite decision was still pending. After the preliminary decision participants were asked to write 
down some reasons for it. The information search consisted of 12 statements (e.g., “The success of 
alternative healing methods cannot be ignored. Therefore, alternative treatments should also be paid 
by health insurance.”).  
In the “decision focus” condition, following every two pieces of information participants 
were asked to think again of their prior decision by instructions like please recall or please think of 
your decision. In the “information focus” condition, while deciding whether or not they wanted to 
read each piece of information in more detail, participants were requested to evaluate each thesis 
with regard to three aspects: credibility of the article, competence of the author, persuasiveness of 
the article. To ensure that participants actually performed this evaluation, they were given a rating 
scale ranging from 1 to 10 for evaluating each aspect. In the control condition, participants just 
selected the pieces of information they wanted to read without any focus manipulation.  
After the preliminary and final decision we measured participants’ commitment by asking 
them to indicate how binding they felt their decision was (scale from 1 = not at all to 10 = very 
much). Afterwards, the participants were debriefed and thanked. 
Results and Discussion 
The 3 x 2 ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for “type of information”, F(1, 74) = 
65.12, p < .001 (participants preferred supporting, M = 2.95, SD = 1.69, to conflicting information, 
M = 1.40, SD = 1.44). In addition, there was the predicted interaction with “focus”, F(2, 74) = 9.81, 
p < .001 (see Table 3), indicating that repeated thinking of the preliminary decision when searching 
for information increased the preference for supporting information compared to the control group 
whereas focus on the information search decreased this preference.  
                                                                                                                                                              
reward (M = 1.95, SD = 1.89). 
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The 3 (focus: decision vs. information vs. no focus) x 2 (commitment: after preliminary 
vs. after final condition) ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor found a main effect 
for commitment, F(1, 74) = 22.32, p < .001 (commitment had increased from the preliminary, M = 
6.03, SD = 2.69, to the final decision, M = 7.03, SD = 2.51) and the predicted interaction, F(2, 74) = 
7.24, p < .002 (see Table 3) suggesting that the decision focus increased the decisions’ salience (as 
measured by commitment, see Pomerantz et al., 1995), whereas the information focus reduced it. 
Furthermore, an increase in participants’ commitment towards their decision correlated significantly 
with the confirmation bias (r = .29, p < .02)5 (see also Jonas et al., 2001; Schulz-Hardt et al., 2000).  
EXPERIMENT 4 
In a final step we wanted to show that commitment, an indicator of decision salience, as well 
as confirmation bias would be increased when promising a monetary reward for the correct 
decision. As greater commitment leads people to defend their beliefs (e.g., Pomerantz et al., 1995) 
we assumed that it would increase participants’ motivation to find more decision-supporting 
information but also increase their motivation to avoid decision-conflicting information. To analyze 
participants’ information treatment – in addition to information search – we included a memory 
measure and predicted that promising a reward would also bias participants’ memory for the 
information presented during the information search. Furthermore, we predicted that commitment 
would mediate the effect of promising a reward on biased information seeking and memory. 
Method 
Participants and design. Forty-two students (18 female) from the University Duisburg-Essen 
participated in this experiment, which was based on a 2 x 2 (reward for correct decision: yes vs. no, 
type of information: supporting vs. conflicting) factorial design with repeated measures on the 
second factor. 
Procedure. The decision case and experimental procedure was the same as in Study 1 with 
the following three exceptions: (1) In the reward condition, participants were promised Euro 3 
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(about US $3.80) instead of DM 5 if their final decision was correct. During the information 
search they were twice reminded that the information could help them find the correct decision 
alternative, and that making the correct final decision would be rewarded by Euro 3. (2) 
Commitment was measured with four items: We measured how binding participants felt their 
decision was and how much they had identified with the company (scale from 1 = not at all to 10 = 
very much). In addition we asked how attractive participants found country A and country B 
(following Pomerantz et al., 1995, who found that attitude extremity loaded strongly on the 
commitment factor). From these two items we calculated an attractiveness difference (attractiveness 
of chosen minus non-chosen alternative) to get an estimate of attitude extremity.6 We first z-
transformed the items measuring participants’ commitment and then created a scale (α = .70). (3) 
Finally, we measured participants’ memory performance by presenting a list of thirty-four 
statements (e.g., “This country offers qualified managerial staff as well as qualified skilled 
workers”) including fifteen statements from the description of the two countries in the decision case 
and nineteen statements from the information search. The participants were asked whether or not 
each statement was correct “only for country A”, “only for country B”, “for both countries A and 
B” or “for none of the two countries”. 
Results7 
Information search. The 2 x 2 ANOVA of the experimental design revealed a marginal main 
effect for type of information, F(1, 28) = 3.67, p < .07 (supporting statements, M = 3.10, SD = 1.58, 
were preferred to conflicting, M = 2.30, SD = 1.56) and an interaction with “reward”, which 
replicated the results of Experiment 1, F(1, 28) = 4.53, p < .05 (see Table 4).  
Commitment. In the reward condition participants showed significantly greater commitment 
                                                                                                                                                              
5
 We also conducted a mediation analysis but found no reliable effect. 
6
 In addition, we asked some further questions not relevant for the aim of this study. 
7
 Three participants who did not follow the instructions, two with missing values on the primary dependent variable and 
one outlier of more than 2.5 standard deviations on the mean (Kirk, 1995) were excluded from the analysis. In addition, 
to have an accurate measure of participants’ commitment to their final decision and for memory of the consonant and 
dissonant information, we excluded another six participants who revised their decision. However, if they were left in the 
analysis the central interaction between type of information and reward for correct decision still approached 
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(M = 0.43, SD = 0.71) than with no reward (M = –0.18, SD = 0.68), t(28) = 2.36, p < .03. 
Furthermore as in the previous experiment commitment correlated positively with the confirmation 
bias (r = .44, p < .02).  
Memory performance. To analyze the results of the memory test we calculated means for the 
correct answers regarding the consonant and dissonant pieces of information. The 2 (reward: yes vs. 
no) x 2 (memory test: consonant vs. dissonant information) ANOVA revealed a main effect for 
memory, F(1, 27) = 7.65, p = .02 (on average participants were better at remembering dissonant, M 
= 0.59, SD = 0.21, than consonant information, M = 0.47, SD = 0.16). This is consistent with prior 
research demonstrating better recall of schema-inconsistent information (e.g., Pyszczynski, 
LaPrelle, & Greenberg, 1988). However, an interaction with “reward”, F(1, 27) = 4.07, p = .05, 
indicated that in the reward condition the relative better memory for the dissonant pieces of 
information disappeared (reward: M = 0.52, SD = 0.19; no reward: M = 0.68, SD = 0.21), whereas 
for the consonant information there was hardly any difference between the two conditions (reward: 
M = 0.49, SD = 0.16; no reward: M = 0.46, SD = 0.17). Furthermore, the higher participants’ 
commitment the worse their memory for the dissonant pieces of information, r = -.53, p = .003 
(there was no correlation regarding consonant information, r = -.04, p > .84). 
Mediation analyses. Following Shrout and Bolger (2002) for small samples (between 20 and 
80 participants) the bootstrap method is more appropriate to test mediation than the Sobel test 
(Sobel, 1982). The results of the bootstrap method (1000 bootstrap samples, using AMOS 6.0, 
Arbuckle, 2005) indicated that the indirect effect of reward on confirmation bias due to mediation 
was statistically significant (p = .04). Also the indirect effect of reward on memory for dissonant 
pieces of information, due to mediation, was statistically significant (p = .03). 
Discussion 
Promising a reward for the correct decision not only increased the confirmation bias in 
information seeking, it also increased participants’ commitment and the increased commitment 
                                                                                                                                                              
significance, F(1, 34) = 3.93, p = .056. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Decision vs. information focus in information seeking 
 
13 
 
mediated the effect of reward on the confirmation bias. Moreover, participants’ in the reward 
condition revealed a relatively worse memory performance for the dissonant pieces of information 
they read during the information search and this measure again correlated with commitment. As the 
dissonant pieces of information threaten participants’ preliminary decision it is not surprising that 
the more committed participants’ felt to their decision the less integrated the dissonant information 
was in their cognitive structure. This corresponds with Pomerantz et al.´s (1995) finding of the 
positive association between commitment and selective judgment and elaboration being both 
mainly caused by the tendency of strongly committed participants to react more critically to 
attitude-incongruent material.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Taken together the present research provides converging support for the idea that focus on a 
decision increases confirmation bias and focus on the information search reduces it. The first 
studies altered the extent of focus on the decision or the information indirectly by promising 
participants a reward for the correct decision (decision focus) or asking them to invest different 
types of costs in the information search (information focus). In Study 3 we then manipulated focus 
on decision vs. on information directly and additionally showed that the repeated thinking about the 
decision, increased participants’ commitment towards their decision, whereas leading participants to 
focus on the available pieces of information decreased commitment. Finally, Study 4 illustrated that 
an indirect induction of decision focus (reward for the correct decision) also increased participants’ 
commitment and that this mediated the effect of reward on both confirmation bias and memory bias. 
Thus, using a variety of operationalizations the findings converge squarely on focus as a key 
variable in understanding biased information seeking. The effects of incentives completely 
depended on whether incentives were given with regard to the decision or the available information. 
The same was true regarding repeated thinking of the decision vs. the available information.  
We propose that our findings can be explained within the framework of dissonance theory: 
Focusing on, and commitment to, the decision should increase the experience of cognitive 
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dissonance, whereas focusing on the information should reduce the experience of dissonance. 
Indeed our findings are in line with other dissonance theoretical research: Using the “forbidden toy 
paradigm”, Zanna, Lepper, and Abelson (1973) found that children in the low punishment condition 
who were reminded of not playing with their favorite toy derogated the toy more than children not 
reminded of their dissonance. Similar effects were observed using a hypocrisy manipulation (Stone, 
Aronson, Crain, Winslow, & Fried, 1994). On the other hand, distracting participants from the 
experience of dissonance (by shifting their attention away from the content of a counter-attitudinal 
essay toward its grammar), led to lower dissonance reduction effects (Brock, 1962). 
A possible alternative process that could have led to our findings is suggested by research 
showing that repeated thinking about an attitude can lead attitudes to become more extreme (Tesser, 
Martin, & Mendolia, 1995).Focus on thinking about the decision may have increased belief in it 
and commitment to it, thereby increasing biased information search. In contrast, increasing thought 
about the information may have reduced thought about the decision and thereby reduced belief in 
the decision. Further research will be needed to closely examine the role of specific affective and 
cognitive processes in these effects.  
The focus approach and accuracy motivation  
With proposing the focus approach to understanding biased information search we do not 
want to rule out that offering an incentive for a correct decision might increase accuracy motivation. 
On the contrary, we agree that the selection of decision strategies is the result of a trade-off between 
the desire to make a correct decision and the desire to minimize effort (cf. Payne et al., 1993). As a 
consequence of an increased benefit of making a correct decision people should be willing to put 
more effort into the decision-making process whereas monetary costs for information decrease the 
benefits of an extensive information search and should therefore reduce the requested information 
(e.g., Gilliland et al., 1993) – and indeed in our experiments participants overall adjusted the 
amount of information searched for accordingly. However, with regard to biases in information 
search and processing there are inconsistent findings in the literature. On the one hand accuracy 
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motivation decreases the confirmation bias (Lundgren & Prislin, 1998; Johnston, 1996), on the 
other hand increasing the stakes in decision problems sometimes leads people to become more 
rigid, overconfident and increases bias (Janis & Mann, 1977; Kunda, 1990; Sieber, 1974). A meta-
analysis by Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, and Shaw (1998) illustrates that incentives primarily motivate 
people to invest more effort in a task, but do not reliably lead to higher decision quality. Yet the 
decision-focus hypothesis provides an explanation: Even if an accuracy goal increases the desire to 
find the correct decision, at the same time it increases the decision’s importance, leads to extensive 
thinking about the decision and thereby increases the decision’s salience (Jenkins et al. 1998; Stone 
& Ziebart, 1995), which in turn can lead to more bias. Indeed, in former research perhaps when 
accuracy motivation decreased confirmation bias, an information focus was activated by telling 
participants that logic and reasoning abilities were examined (Lundgren & Prislin, 1998) or that 
they had to be as accurate in their perception as possible (Johnston, 1996). 
Practical implications 
To what extent is it possible to suggest interventions for practical decision-making when an 
open-minded handling of new information is important to prevent or correct bad decisions?8 As 
repeated thinking of the decision increases the confirmation bias one recommendation for decision-
makers would be to distance themselves from their decision when searching and considering new 
information. To first get an overview over the available pieces of information before thinking of 
their implication might help here (see Jonas et al., 2001). It would also be useful to prevent early 
justifications for why one prefers a specific decision alternative. Remaining uncommitted as long as 
possible in the decision process enhances open-mindedness towards new information (see also 
                                                
8
 Given that our experiments were conducted in the tradition of former dissonance research on selective exposure (Frey, 
1986), we asked our participants to make a preliminary decision before they searched for additional information. One 
might question to what extent this procedure fulfills external validity. However, we understand the process of making a 
decision as a continuum between generating a decision preference successively getting stronger, resulting first in a 
preliminary and later in a definite decision (cf. Svenson, 1992). During this process people can, at different points, 
search for new information. There are many situations in which people make a preliminary selection from a variety of 
possible options and then test the adequacy of their choice by searching for new information before making their final 
decision. Yet, Russo and colleagues showed that predecisional distortions occur even in the absence of any initial 
choice. Any leaning towards one alternative, regardless how tentative influenced the evaluation of subsequent 
information (Russo, Meloy & Medvec, 1998; Carlson & Russo, 2001). 
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Dailey, 1952, or Elstein, Shulman, & Sprafka, 1978). Dailey (1952), for example, illustrates that 
people make better judgments when they survey the data as a whole instead of pausing in between 
and drawing inferences from the segments they have surveyed so far.  
Another lesson learned from the present experiments is to be careful when promising 
incentives for a correct decision. Because incentives inevitably lead people to think of a decision, 
incentive can induce bolstering of a decision by preferring supporting over conflicting information. 
It is therefore important to combine incentives with motivating decision-makers to shift their 
attention to the information search process. For example, instead of making people justify the 
decision results, one possibility would be to induce justification for the decision process. An 
information focus could also be induced by investing costs in the information search (money, effort, 
or reflecting on which information one wants to read). All these conditions seem to prevent people 
from easily adding supporting information. Thus, these are strategies that individually or in 
combination can increase information focus and minimize decision focus, thereby encouraging the 
consideration of conflicting information and facilitating optimal judgment and decision-making. 
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Table 1:  
Means and standard deviations (in brackets) for information search dependent on the information 
search mode in Experiment 1 
 Reward for correct decision 
 No Yes 
Confirmation bias A 
Supporting information 
Conflicting information 
–0.08 (1.19) a 
1.15 (1.07) b 
1.23 (1.01) 
+1.00 (1.36) a 
2.00 (1.41) b 
1.00 (1.18) b 
n 13 14 
Notes:  
A
 The “confirmation bias” corresponds to the difference between the number of supporting and 
conflicting pieces of information chosen. 
a,b
 Numbers with the same subscript per row or column differ significantly from each other.  
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Table 2:  
Means and standard deviations (in brackets) for information search dependent on the information 
search mode in Experiment 3 
 Information search 
 free 0.50 DM (25 cent) for  
each piece of information 
Confirmation bias A 
Supporting information 
Conflicting information 
+0.53 (0.92) a 
2.20 (0.94) b 
1.67 (1.23) b 
–0.19 (1.05) a 
1.00 (0.82) b 
1.19 (0.83) 
n 15 16 
Notes:  
A
 The “confirmation bias” corresponds to the difference between the number of supporting and 
conflicting pieces of information chosen.  
a,b
 Numbers with the same subscript per row or column differ significantly from each other.  
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Table 3: 
Means and standard deviations (in brackets) for information search dependent on decision and 
information focus in Experiment 3 
 
 No focus Decision focus Information  focus 
Confirmation bias A 
Supporting information 
Conflicting information 
 
+1.50 (2.01) a 
2.81 (1.39) b 
1.31 (1.12) b 
+2.64 (1.58) a 
3.80 (1.32) b 
1.16 (1.03) b 
+0.54 (1.45) a 
2.27 (1.95) b 
1.73 (1.97) 
Increase in commitment 
from the preliminary to 
the final decision a 
 
+0.77 (1.84) c 
  
 
+2.12 (2.39) c, d 
  
 
+0.15 (1.29) d 
 
n 26 25 26 
Notes:  
A
 The “confirmation bias” corresponds to the difference between the number of supporting and 
conflicting pieces of information chosen.  
a,b,c,d
 Numbers with the same subscript per row or column differ significantly from each other.  
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 Table 4:  
Means and standard deviations (in brackets) for information search dependent on the information 
search mode in Experiment 4 
 Reward for correct decision 
 No Yes 
Confirmation bias A 
Supporting information 
Conflicting information 
 
- 0.08 (1.66) a 
2.61 (1.71) 
2.69 (1.75) 
(13) 
+1.47 (2.18) a 
3.47 (1.42) b 
2.00 (1.37) b 
(17) 
Notes:  
A
 The “confirmation bias” corresponds to the difference between the number of supporting and 
conflicting pieces of information chosen.  
a,b
 Numbers with the same subscript per row or column differ significantly from each other.  
 
